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 I. Scotland 
Martin Hogg 
A. LEGISLATION 
1. Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017, asp 13 
1 This statute, in force since 4 October 2017, adds a number of new sections 
(17A–17D) to the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. These 
new sections have the effect of removing the three-year limitation period (the 
triennium) which would otherwise be applicable to personal damages claims 
in respect of childhood abuse. To benefit from the lifting of the limitation pe-
riod, the party who is claiming for the injuries must have been under the age 
of eighteen on the date when the injuries occurred (or in the case of continu-
ing injuries, when the injuries began), the injuries must have derived from 
abuse (which includes sexual, physical, and emotional abuse, as well as ne-
glect1), and the injured party must raise the claim personally.2 
2 The new provisions have retrospective effect, extending to rights of action 
accruing before the coming into force of the provisions,3 and additionally they 
grant some prior litigants a right to bring a new claim. Such a new claim is 
possible if a prior claim was disposed of by a court either under sec 17 of the 
1973 Act (the section imposing the triennium) or under a relevant settlement,4 
 
1 New sec 17A(2) of the 1973 Act, as inserted by sec 1 of this statute. 
2 New sec 17A(1) of the 1973 Act. 
3 New sec 17B of the 1973 Act. 
4 New sec 17C(2) of the 1973 Act. A ‘relevant settlement’ is one (i) agreed by the parties 
to the initial action, (ii) entered into by the pursuer under the reasonable belief that the 
initial action was likely to be disposed of by the court by reason of sec 17, and (iii) one 
under which any sum of money which was required to be paid by the defender to the 
pursuer, or to a person nominated by the pursuer, did not exceed the pursuer's expenses 
in connection with bringing and settling the initial action: see new sec 17C(4) of the 
1973 Act. 
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and it does not matter that the prior action was disposed of (even by way of 
absolvitor, ie an order of the court finding no liability on the defender’s part).5 
3 The triennium will continue to apply to childhood abuse cases where the de-
fender satisfies the court that he/she would be substantially prejudiced were 
the action to proceed or where, having had regard to the pursuer’s interest in 
the action proceeding, the court is satisfied that the prejudice is such that the 
action should not proceed.6 
4 The new Act is a significant change to the legal approach to childhood abuse 
claims, of which many unsuccessful examples have been mentioned in recent 
Yearbooks. Previously, the triennium provided for a three-year limitation pe-
riod which could only be postponed to a determinable later date in cases 
where the pursuer could not reasonably have become aware that he/she had 
suffered injuries which were the result of another’s act or omission and which 
were sufficiently serious to justify a claim until such determinable later date.7 
This meant that, in most childhood abuse cases, the victim would be expected 
to raise a claim at the latest when they became an adult. A further provision of 
the 1973 Act allowed (and continues to allow) the court to override the trien-
nium in any personal injury case if it seemed to the court ‘equitable’ to do so, 
but the long passage of time between the occurrence of childhood abuse and 
claims for such abuse being raised has typically persuaded courts in the past 
that it would not be equitable to exercise such discretion.  
5 The new provisions will allow many childhood abuse claims which would not 
previously have been admitted to be litigated. We can also expect to see old 
cases being reopened, given the retrospective effect of the new Law. It is like-
ly therefore that next year’s Yearbook may contain reference to the first batch 
of cases under the new provisions. It will be interesting to see how cautiously 
or generously the courts interpret the ‘substantial prejudice’ check on the new 
provisions. It may well be that, in cases where an exceptionally long period of 
time has passed since the abuse,8 and/or many of the relevant witnesses or al-
leged perpetrators have died, the courts will still be unwilling to allow claims 
to proceed. 
 
5 New sec 17C(3). 
6 New sec 17D. 
7 See sec 17(2)(b) of the 1973 Act.  
8 Such as the more than 50 year period in the K v Marist Brothers of the Schools case 
referred to (no 69 below). 
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B. CASES 
1. C v G, Court of Session (Outer House), 17 January 2017, 
[2017] CSOH 5, 2017 Scots Law Times (SLT) 79: Civil 
Damages Claim in Respect of Rape 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
6 The pursuer was a young woman who alleged that she had been raped by two 
men, the defenders. Despite a police investigation of the alleged rape, no 
prosecution was brought against the men by the public prosecutor. The wom-
an subsequently raised a civil claim for damages against the defenders on the 
ground that their actions constituted the common law delicts of sexual assault 
and rape. The defenders argued that no delicts had been committed, because 
the woman had consented to sexual intercourse. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
7 The judge (Lord Armstrong) held that: (1) the act of rape was an actionable 
civil wrong and, whether the act was viewed as criminal or delictual, no mate-
rial distinction arose in respect of its constituent elements; (2) this being a de-
lictual claim, the standard of proof to be satisfied by the pursuer was that of 
the balance of probabilities (and not the higher criminal law standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt); and (3) the evidence of the pursuer—that she was, 
because of excessive consumption of alcohol, incapable of giving consent—
was cogent, persuasive, and compelling. The judge therefore found in favour 
of the pursuer, and pronounced decree against the defenders, jointly and sev-
erally, in the sum of £ 100,000.9 
c) Commentary 
8 This is an historically significant decision, as it is the first occasion on which a 
civil claim for damages in respect of a rape has been successfully pursued be-
fore a Scottish court. The case attracted a degree of media interest, not just 
because of its legal novelty but on account of the defenders being professional 
footballers. The controversial decision of the Crown not to prosecute the men 
is not considered here, rather the focus is on the delictual aspects of the case.  
 
9 This judgment was appealed against: see [2017] Court of Session, Inner House (CSIH) 
72, 2017 Scots Law Times (SLT) 1311. However, the appeal is not considered here 
because (a) it was unsuccessful, and (b) it related not to the legal basis of the claim but 
only to alleged errors of assessment of evidence. 
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9 A number of delicts in Scots law are also crimes10 (including assault, rape, 
unlawful deprivation of liberty, and fraud), though the rise of competent na-
tional prosecution and police services, together with a statutory criminal inju-
ries compensation scheme,11 has largely undercut the rationale for damages 
claims in respect of such delicts. However, the possibility of utilising the civil 
law, rather than relying upon state actors to take remedial action on a victim’s 
behalf, has continued to exist. The desirability of maintaining this parallel civ-
il route is evident in a case where, as in this one, the criminal authorities de-
cline (for whatever reason) to act.12 
10 There are two points of law briefly worthy of note in this judgment. First, the 
court points out that the substance of the harm alleged is the same in the crim-
inal and delictual law. So, a pursuer in a case of this sort knows that she must 
prove the same elements of her case as would be applicable in a criminal 
prosecution. However, she is advantaged by the lower, civil standard of proof 
required: she need only prove to the court that her version of the evidence is 
more persuasive than that of the defenders. Even if the pursuer’s version of 
events is only just more persuasive by a small margin, that is enough to dis-
charge the burden of proof. Without the advantage of the investigative re-
sources of the police, this helps to counterbalance the evidence-gathering dis-
advantage from which a private party such as this pursuer may suffer.  
11 The second point to note follows from the first point about the same legal 
requirements applying in criminal and delictual law. It relates specifically to 
the pursuer’s capacity to consent to sexual intercourse, and what the defenders 
ought reasonably to have concluded about that. The pursuer was very drunk 
on the evening on which the events took place; the defenders however con-
tended that ‘at no time had the pursuer said “no”’.13 The judge, drawing a par-
allel with the concept of consent in the criminal law of rape, notes: 
‘That, however, in a case of this sort, could never be determinative. The cur-
rent state of the law, having regard to the modern defined meaning of consent 
… sends a clear signal that anyone dealing with someone who is intoxicated is 
put on notice that that person may not be able to give consent no matter what 
she says or does …’.14 
 
10 See further J Blackie, The interaction of crime and delict in Scotland, in: M Dyson (ed), 
Unravelling Tort and Crime (2014) 356–388. 
11 For further information, see <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/criminal-
injuries-compensation-authority>. 
12 In addition to civil recovery, there is also the possibility (almost never successful) of a 
victim of a crime raising a private criminal prosecution under a procedure called a Bill of 
Criminal Letters. 
13 Para [343]. 
14 Ibid. 
Error! Use the Home tab to apply Überschrift 1 to the text that you want to appear 
here. 5 
That seems an entirely accurate summary of the current view of consent to 
sexual intercourse (which looks for the presence of active consent, rather than 
the absence of a refusal to consent), and explains the judge’s conclusion that 
the defenders culpably ignored clear indicators that the pursuer was not capa-
ble of giving meaningful consent. 
12 This ground-breaking decision may be unlikely to be repeated with much 
frequency, given that the unusual decision of the Crown not to prosecute on 
facts such as these must be rare. However, the decision is welcome in provid-
ing a clear basis for a future claim of this sort, if it is ever needed.  
2. Chalmers v Diageo Scotland Ltd, Court of Session (Outer 
House), 3 March 2017, [2017] CSOH 36: Liability of Whisky 
Manufacturer for Release of Ethanol during Whisky Aging 
Process; Alleged Damage to Property Caused by Fungus 
Thriving on Ethanol; Whether Damage amounted to a 
Nuisance 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
13 The pursuers claimed damages from the defenders in respect of alleged dam-
age caused to the pursuers’ house and outdoor property by the release of etha-
nol vapour from maturing whisky casks stored by the defenders in bonded 
warehouses adjacent to the pursuers’ home.15 The alleged damage was the oc-
currence of a black fungus, thriving on ethanol, which coated the pursuers’ 
home and other property. The pursuers argued that this damage was caused by 
the fault of the defenders, and that such fault amounted to an actionable nui-
sance.  
14 The defenders argued, inter alia, that: (1) given that the defenders’ business 
was longstanding and the pursuers were incomers, the pursuers had failed to 
set out an adequate case that, in the locality in which their property stood, the 
threshold laid down by the law of nuisance had been breached; (2) in any 
event, the pursuers’ case failed the requirement for actionable nuisance that 
any alleged harmful impact must be more than reasonably tolerable (plus 
quam tolerabile); (3) regulation by expert public authorities, acting in the pub-
lic interest, would be undermined by individual claims seeking to set individ-
ual standards. The regulatory regime specifically required the emission of eth-
anol from the warehouse, and such regulation balanced the interest of produc-
 
15 The ethanol released during this whisky maturation process is commonly referred to as 
‘The Angels’ Share’: see judgment of Lord Ericht at para [1]. 
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ers, the public, and individuals; and (4) that any right of action the pursuers 
might have had had prescribed.  
b) Judgment of the Court 
15 The judge held that the pursuers had pled a relevant case of nuisance, and 
ordered a proof before answer (a trial of the facts before determination of the 
legal arguments). In relation to the defenders’ arguments specified above, the 
judge thought that: (1) there was some ambiguity in prior case law regarding 
whether, and if so how, the question of the pre-existing nature of a locality 
should be taken into account in an action of nuisance. This problem could be 
resolved only after proof (a trial of the facts); (2) the issue of whether the 
damage caused was plus quam tolerabile could only be determined after 
proof; (3) though the fact that regulations were being complied with might be 
relevant to whether an activity was a nuisance, only an examination of the 
facts could determine this in specific cases, and this was another reason why a 
proof was needed; and (4) it was unclear which of two sections (7 or 8) of the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 might be applicable in this 
case, and that this ought also to be resolved after proof. In all of these circum-
stances, a proof before answer was ordered by the court. 
c) Commentary 
16 There could be few judgments more quintessentially Scottish than one about 
the manufacture of whisky. Whisky lovers might be somewhat perturbed that 
the manufacture of their favoured spirit might be argued to be a harmful act, 
but the facts of this case indicate how (if substantiated by relevant evidence) 
that might be so.16  
17 A number of aspects of the judgment are of interest. First, there is the issue of 
the relevance of the nature of the locality to the question of whether a nui-
sance has occurred. Lord Ericht notes that the ‘nature of the locality goes to 
the question of whether the use was plus quam tolerabile’.17 That is undoubt-
edly correct: what, for instance, may constitute a nuisance in terms of noise in 
the locality of a busy airport is doubtless different to what might do so in the 
vicinity of a quiet country village. Somewhat more challenging is the extent to 
which, in assessing the character of a locality, the defender’s conduct alleged 
to be the basis of the nuisance should or should not be taken into account. 
Lord Ericht’s belief that the correct approach is unclear stems from a debate in 
English law between one view (promoted by Lord Neuberger in Coventry and 
 
16 There is a body of published literature relating to the ethanol-related growth of the 
fungus baudoinia, including an article cited in the judgment: James A Scott et al, 
Baudoinia, a new genus to accommodate Torula compniacensis (2007) 99(4) Mycologia 
592–601. 
17 Para [16]. 
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others v Lawrence and another)18 that, when assessing the character of the lo-
cality, the defender’s conduct should be left out of account,19 and the incon-
sistent view (propounded by Lord Carnwath in the same case) that an ‘exist-
ing activity can in my view clearly be taken into account if it is part of the es-
tablished pattern of use’.20 Lord Ericht expresses no view on this issue (unre-
solved, it seems, in Scots law), preferring to leave doing so until after a trial of 
the facts. The Neuberger view is more favourable towards potential claimants 
in instances where the defender is the only source of a harmful activity, as 
leaving such activity out of the equation when assessing the locality is likely 
to lead to a starker assessment of the impact of the defender’s activities. No 
view is expressed by his Lordship on a further aspect of locality, whether (in 
Scots law) there is a defence of ‘coming to the nuisance’ (ie a defence that a 
pursuer chose to move into a locality where activities complained of were al-
ready being undertaken), or whether it may be relevant that a pursuer’s change 
of use of its land has changed the effect of the defender’s conduct such that it 
has become a nuisance.21 
18 A second aspect worthy of note relates to the impact of regulatory compliance 
on a finding of nuisance. Differing views were again taken of this in the Cov-
entry case, with Lord Carnwath adopting a minority approach which preferred 
to ‘start from the presumption that the established pattern of uses generally 
represents society’s view of the appropriate balance of uses in a particular ar-
ea’.22 Such an approach would give little, if any, room for nuisance to operate 
where there was compliance with regulations. By contrast, Lord Neuberger 
thought that ‘the mere fact that an activity … has the benefit of a planning 
permission is normally of no assistance to the defendant in a claim brought by 
a neighbour who contends that the activity causes a nuisance to her land’.23 
That Lord Ericht avoids favouring one of these views cannot be criticised, 
given that his Lordship did not, at this stage of the proceedings, benefit from 
argument on the nature and content of the relevant regulations.  
19 Finally, on the prescription issue, there was uncertainty as to whether sec 7 or 
8 of the 1973 Act ought to govern the facts of the case: sec 7 provides for a 
long negative prescriptive period of twenty years, so as to extinguish rights to 
(among other things) reparation if no claim (or acknowledgment of such a 
claim) has been made for a continuous period of twenty years; sec 8 separate-
ly provides for a long negative prescriptive period of 20 years for certain un-
exercised or unenforced rights relating to property. Though the prescriptive 
 
18 Coventry and others v Lawrence and another [2014] United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(UKSC) 46. 
19 See judgment of Lord Neuberger, para [65] of Coventry.  
20 Para [187] of Coventry. 
21 See Lord Ericht’s judgment at para [31].  
22 Para [183] of Coventry. 
23 Para [94] of Coventry. 
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period is the same, the date from which the period provided for under each 
section starts to run might conceivably be different, so it is important to know 
which section applies. There is no definitive case law on the matter, and aca-
demic views are (so the judge opined) inconclusive. The view of the court 
would thus have been of great interest here, but this was another matter which 
was said to be indeterminable until a trial of the facts. 
20 This judgment raised a number of interesting issues, as detailed above. Frus-
tratingly however (if understandably, given the procedural stage of the claim), 
while the court discusses these issues, no clear answers are given because of 
the suggestion that the facts need to be clear before the law, whatever it may 
be, can be decided and applied. Given the uncertain state of Scots law on a 
number of the questions raised in this case, it is to be hoped that the litigation 
may give rise to further reported stages which definitively address these mat-
ters.  
3. D Geddes Contractors Ltd v Neil Johnson Health & Safety 
Services Ltd, Court of Session (Outer House), 14 March 2017, 
[2017] CSOH 42: Liability of a Health & Safety Consultant 
for the Criminal Conviction of its Client for Health and 
Safety Breach Resulting in Death of a Worker; Ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
21 On 26 July 2012, Joseph Troup, an employee of the pursuer, sustained a fatal 
accident while working at the pursuer’s quarry. Mr Troup, a lorry driver, was 
tipping materials into a feed hopper. At the edge of the raised area above the 
hopper there was a stop block, the purpose of which was to prevent lorries 
from reversing over the edge. As Mr Troup reversed his lorry, it passed over 
the stop block and fell into the hopper, killing him. 
22 The accident was investigated by the Health and Safety Executive. It was 
found that tipped sand and gravel had built up in front of the stop block, al-
lowing it to act as a ramp over which a large-wheeled vehicle was capable of 
driving. The pursuer was charged with a breach of Regulation 6 of the Quar-
ries Regulations 1999. A plea of guilty was tendered, and the pursuer was 
fined £ 200,000.  
23 At the time of Mr Troup’s accident, the defender was engaged by the pursuer 
to provide health and safety advice concerning the operation of the quarry. As 
part of the provision of that advice, the defender undertook regular inspections 
of the quarry and supplied inspection reports to the pursuer. The pursuer 
sought to recover the £ 200,000 fine from the defender, arguing that an ordi-
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narily competent health and safety adviser, exercising ordinary skill and care, 
would have advised it that the stop block was lower than the minimum height 
required by the relevant Approved Code of Practice, and of the need for the 
block to be as vertical as possible to avoid ramping. Had it been so advised, 
the pursuer argued that it would have taken the steps necessary to rectify those 
defects before the accident and resultant prosecution.  
24 The defender denied that it had been negligent and argued that the cause of 
the accident was the purser’s own negligence in failing to take measures to 
address the build-up of tipped materials in front of the block. The defender al-
so advanced an argument founded upon a special application of the general 
policy of the law that ex turpi causa non oritur actio, ie that no action may be 
founded upon turpitudinous conduct. It argued that compensation was not re-
coverable for damage that flowed from loss of liberty, a fine, or other punish-
ment lawfully imposed as a consequence of one’s own unlawful act. This 
principle (it argued) precluded the pursuer from claiming the amount of its fi-
ne.  
b) Judgment of the Court 
25 The judge (Lord Tyre) held that the pursuer had pled a relevant case for re-
covery of the value of the fine. His Lordship held that, there being no Scottish 
authority on point, it was appropriate to look to English case law.  
26 The question for determination was whether a ‘strict liability’ exception ap-
plies to cases where the loss that the claimant seeks to recover arises as a con-
sequence of a punishment (or other disposal) imposed by a criminal court, and 
not directly as a result of the commission of a criminal act itself. Reviewing 
English authority, as well as a decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal, his 
Lordship held that there was no authority for the proposition that recovery of a 
loss consisting of a criminal penalty or the consequences of imposition of a 
criminal sanction is necessarily excluded by the in turpi causa principle.24 
What is important in each case is an assessment of the responsibility of the 
claimant: intentional wrongdoing on the part of the claimant is not the only 
basis upon which a right of recovery of criminal penalties may be excluded by 
the ex turpi causa principle – negligence may also do so. It might be that the 
pursuer had been negligent in this case, but that could only be determined by a 
proof before answer (a trial of the facts followed by determination of the rele-
vant law), which his Lordship therefore ordered. 
 
24 Para [17]. 
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c) Commentary 
27 This judgment is of interest in a number of respects: it considers a matter not 
apparently settled in Scots law; it makes commendable use of comparative au-
thority in reaching a principled conclusion; and it analyses whether a distinc-
tion between types of ex turpi causa case ought to be reflected in a difference 
in outcome.  
28 Scotland is a small jurisdiction, and one of the consequences of this is that 
from time to time a matter will arise for adjudication without any clear legal 
rule existing for its determination. In such cases, courts may decide by analo-
gy, by arguing for an extension of the rules from principle, and/or by refer-
ence to comparative legal material. So far as doctrine in this field is con-
cerned, there is an established principle of ex turpi causa, but its ambit in 
Scottish decisions has historically been in relation to what is styled the ‘wider’ 
form, ie a rule that compensation is not recoverable for loss suffered as a con-
sequence of one’s own criminal act, rather than a so-called ‘narrower’ form, ie 
a rule that compensation is not recoverable for damage that flows from loss of 
liberty, a fine or other punishment lawfully imposed as a consequence of 
one’s own unlawful act.25 The wider form thus deals with direct consequences 
of ‘turpitudinous conduct’, the narrower form with more remote consequences 
(those requiring the subsequent intervention of the courts adjudicating upon 
the conduct). 
29 In this case, the judge chose to make substantial use of comparative judg-
ments, mostly English (from Burrows v Rhodes and Jamieson26 to Les La-
boratoires Servier v Apotex Inc27) as well (more unusually) as a decision of 
the Singapore Court of Appeal.28 These were used to show a consistent view 
of Common Law courts that: (1) the narrow and wider aspects of the ex turpi 
causa rule should be treated in the same way, and (2) the appropriate ap-
proach, in all cases, to whether a civil claim deriving from the claimant’s 
criminal conduct should be excluded involves a balancing of policy considera-
tions. Lord Tyre’s suggestion that, in undertaking such a balancing exercise, 
regard should be had to the ‘responsibility’ of the claimant, whether deriving 
from intention or negligence, puts the matter in a commendably clear way and 
helps to explain prior comparative case law (including cases excluding claims 
where the claimant was negligent). Such a view mandates, of course, a trial of 
the facts to determine where negligence was present, hence the order made by 
the court in this case.  
 
25 See a discussion of these two forms, by reference to the speech of Lord Hoffmann in 
Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] United Kingdom House of Lords (UKHL) 33, [2009] 
2 Appeal Cases (AC) 1339, at para [32], in Lord Tyre’s judgment at para [6]. 
26 [1899] 1 Queen’s Bench (QB) 816. 
27 [2015] AC 430. 
28 United Project Consultants Pte Ltd v Leong Kwok Onn [2005] Supreme Court of 
Singapore (SGCA) 38. 
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30 This is a welcome decision, adding useful clarity (albeit only at the level of a 
first instance judgment) to a previously unconsidered question of Scots law. It 
is to be hoped that the approach will be affirmed by higher courts.  
4. Huntaven Properties Ltd v Hunter Construction (Aberdeen) 
Ltd and others, Court of Session (Outer House), 30 March 
2017, [2017] CSOH 57: Liability for Defectively Constructed 
Concrete Works; When Prescription Operates to Extinguish 
Claims for Liability 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
31 The pursuer owned a pipe storage facility in Aberdeenshire. In 2008–2009 a 
large concrete slab was constructed at the yard. Following its completion, ini-
tial defects in the slab (the absence of air entrainment29 and fibres) were ob-
served in September 2009, more substantial defects being observed in Febru-
ary 2010. The pursuer did not, at those times, have the cause of these investi-
gated. In March 2010, the pursuer instructed the first defender to make good 
the defects. Repairs were carried out between August and November 2010, 
and on 16 November 2010, following an inspection, a making good defects 
certificate was issued on behalf of the pursuer. On 11 February 2011, a final 
payment was made by the pursuer for the work. Until May 2011, it appeared 
that the remedial work had been effective, but thereafter defects again became 
apparent.  
32 The pursuer claimed that each of the four defenders was responsible for the 
defects through breach of a number of obligations. It sought damages of £ 3.6 
million from them jointly and severally for breach of contract, and in relation 
to the first defender (the main contractor) and third defender (a consulting en-
gineering firm) it also alleged concurrent liability in delict. Apart from the 
second defender (an insolvent subcontractor, which had had decree in absence 
pronounced against it), each of the other defenders denied liability, as well as 
argued that any obligation to make reparation to the pursuer had prescribed by 
virtue of the five-year prescriptive period applicable by virtue of the Prescrip-
tion and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 (‘the 1973 Act’). 
33 The defenders argued that the breaches giving rise to each of the obligations 
to make reparation occurred and were completed before the date of practical 
completion of the work, and that the pursuer was aware (or could with reason-
able diligence have been aware) of relevant material loss, injury, or damage 
 
29 Air entrainment is the intentional creation of small air bubbles within concrete in order 
to make the concrete more durable.  
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more than five years before a claim in relation to each of the obligations was 
made. The pursuer argued, inter alia, that: (1) none of the obligations founded 
upon became enforceable before 16 November 2010 because before that date 
the pursuer suffered no loss; (2) each of the defenders’ acts, neglects, or de-
faults had been a continuing act, neglect, or default which had not ceased until 
at least the certificate of making good defects was issued, and possibly until 
the final payment; and (3) the pursuer was not aware, and could not with rea-
sonable diligence have become aware, that it had suffered loss until May 
2011. Prior to that date, although it had become aware of defects in the slab, it 
had not suffered a loss because the first defenders had been obliged to remedy 
those defects and had appeared to do so. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
34 The case called before Lord Doherty for a preliminary determination of the 
pleas relating to prescription. For the purposes of this determination, his Lord-
ship treated both the contractual and delictual claims together (as the two ba-
ses for each claim were alleged to give rise to an equivalent duty to make rep-
aration). He held that the slab contained latent defects from the outset because 
of the absence of air entrainment and because the fibres had been poorly 
mixed.30 Neither those defects, nor the manifestation of physical damage 
when it occurred, were transitory. Material damage had become apparent in 
September 2009.  
35 In relation to the first defender’s obligation to make reparation for its failure 
to mix the fibres into the concrete properly, the court held that prima fa-
cie there was concurrence of injuria (injury) and damnum (damage) by 
22 February 2010, and in respect of the third defender’s obligations to make 
reparation, prima facie there was concurrence of injuria and damnum by 
21 September 2009.31 By those dates, prima facie each of those obligations 
had become enforceable (under secs 6 and 11(1) of the 1973 Act32). The court 
added that the existence of contractual remedies in respect of the damage did 
not postpone the occurrence of injuria or damnum until the end of the defects 
liability period nor did it exclude the pursuer’s common law right to damages. 
The authorities did not support the view that a provision such as the clause 
(17.2) in the main contract requiring defects to be remedied postponed the 
concurrence of injuria and damnum until the expiry of the defects liability pe-
riod.33 
 
30 Para [54]. 
31 Para [52]. 
32 Sections 6 and 11(1) have the effect that if, after the date when loss, injury, or damage 
occurs, an obligation to make reparation has subsisted for a continuous period of five 
years without a relevant claim having been made or the subsistence of the obligation 
having been acknowledged, it prescribes.  
33 Para [57]. 
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36 In relation to the alleged breach by the first defender of the repairing obliga-
tion in clause 17.2, there was no concurrence of injuria and damnum until 
there had been defective performance of the obligation to make good the de-
fects,34 and this obligation had not elapsed by virtue of the five-year prescrip-
tive period before the claim had been raised.  
37 As regards potential postponement of the start of the prescriptive period ap-
plying to the various obligations at play: in relation to the first defender, once 
the slab had been constructed and handed over, each of those acts, neglects, or 
defaults had been completed, and this was not undermined by the fact that 
some of the first defender’s obligations under the contract fell to be performed 
after practical completion;35 and in relation to the third defender, if its obliga-
tion to the pursuer to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence in carrying 
out its services as structural engineer for the project had indeed been 
breached, then this occurred, at the latest, by the time of practical completion. 
In each case no postponement of the commencement of the prescriptive period 
was applicable.  
38 The court thus held that the pursuer’s claim against the first defender for fail-
ure to remedy the notified defects had not prescribed, but that that against the 
third defender for alleged breach of its duty to take reasonable care had done 
so. Having given judgment on the issues relating to prescription, Lord 
Doherty remitted the case for a discussion as to further appropriate procedure. 
c) Commentary 
39 Claims raising arguments about the prescription of obligations are notoriously 
complex. They require a close analysis of the relevant statute (in Scotland, the 
1973 Act) as well as a clear understanding of the specific obligation said to 
have been breached. In this case, the obligations alleged to have been 
breached by the defenders were said to lie (in the case of two of the defenders) 
in contract and concurrently in delict. For the purpose of the preliminary de-
termination of the issues around prescription, the court worked from the as-
sumption that delictual obligations were owed by the two defenders, and thus 
simply looked at the specific claims as being for reparation (damage) without 
concerning itself any further with the underlying cause of action.  
40 The first defender (the main contractor) was alleged to have failed in its duties 
in a number of respects, by: (i) failing to take adequate steps to mix the fibres 
into the concrete and ensure that they were evenly and properly spread 
throughout the slab; (ii) failing to warn the pursuer of the absence of air en-
trainment within the slab and that such absence would make the failure of the 
 
34 Para [59]. 
35 Paras [65]–[66]. 
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slab inevitable; and (iii) using concrete not in accordance with good building 
practice. Each of these failures occurred at different times, so that in relation 
to the failure to perform each, a different start point for the prescriptive period 
would apply. Calculation of the relevant date from which the prescriptive 
clock ought to run in respect of faulty construction causing (initially) latent 
damage is a difficult matter, and there is a developed body of case law analys-
ing when damage may be taken to have been discovered (or discoverable) and 
thus actionable. In this case, the judge had to consider whether the damage to 
the slab which manifested itself might be only ‘transitory’ and likely to be 
remedied by the carrying out of the subsequent stages of the work. His con-
clusion that it was not merely transitory seems a reasonable one.  
41 Additionally, the main contract in this case provided for a mechanism (in 
clause 17.2) by which the pursuer could order defective work to be remedied 
within a fourteen-day period. A failure by the contractor to undertake such 
remedial work properly would trigger a separate duty of reparation, one at-
tracting its own prescriptive period. This turned out to be beneficial to the 
pursuer, for while the prescriptive period for some of the other claims had ex-
pired, that in respect of the breach of this duty had not. The court considered 
that it was only from the date when the remedial works were certified as hav-
ing been carried out properly (which it transpired they had not) that the pre-
scriptive period began to run, and noted that a claim for breach of the duty of 
repair had been raised within five years of this date (and so was validly 
raised). This view rests on the idea that, a certificate having been issued stat-
ing that repairs have been done, it is from the point of issuance of such certifi-
cate that defective performance of the obligation can be said to have occurred. 
This seems a reasonable approach to the issue of when damage in respect of 
this duty occurred, though it is noteworthy that the court did not consider, in 
relation to the obligation to make reparation for this damage, whether post-
ponement of the prescriptive period might be argued to have applied under 
sec 11(3) of the Act (because it took several months for the pursuer to become 
aware that the remedial work had not been properly undertaken). It did, how-
ever, consider postponement arguments in relation to other alleged breaches 
of obligation (as discussed in the following paragraph). 
42 In relation to the court’s conclusions on postponement of the running of the 
prescriptive clock in relation to some of the obligations (narrated at no 37 
above), the court makes the clear point that the contractor’s obligation to do 
the work of the contract (such as the competent mixing of the concrete) is dif-
ferent to the obligation to undertake competent repairs when instructed to do 
so. That being so, the damage flowing from the defective performance of the 
work occurred earlier than that flowing from the defective repairs, and the ob-
ligation to make reparation for the first sort of damage prescribed earlier than 
the second sort of damage. Additionally, the judge notes—so far as the third 
defender’s duty was concerned—that the general duty to exercise skill and 
care in the work done is different to any duty which might have existed on the 
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third defender (though such a duty was not argued for by the pursuer) to re-
view the fourth defender’s design after the slab had been constructed and to 
warn the pursuer at that stage of the absence of air entrainment. Had such a 
duty been argued for, it would have been subject to a different prescriptive pe-
riod.  
43 This, like many cases on prescription of duties in the construction industry, 
required resolution of a complex mix of factual and legal issues. It serves as a 
reminder of the importance to potential claimants of reflecting on the exist-
ence of multiple potential duties (such as that of repair): the more such duties 
can be argued for, the greater the likelihood that at least one of the duties has 
not yet prescribed. 
5. JD v Lothian Health Board, Court of Session (Inner 
House), 28 April 2017, [2017] CSIH 27: Appeal against 
Finding of No Medical Negligence; Damages Claim for 
Distress, Anxiety, and Humiliation 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
44 The pursuer raised an action of damages for £ 125,000 alleging negligent 
misdiagnosis of late onset hypogonadotrophic hypogonadism (diminished 
gonadal function) by a medical practitioner and a subsequent failure to con-
nect this condition to his childhood asthma. The pursuer’s claim (which had 
been brought by him personally, without legally qualified assistance) was in 
respect of the shock, emotional distress, anxiety, sleep deprivation, and fear 
which he alleged he had suffered as a result. The claim was dismissed at first 
instance on the ground of irrelevancy, and the pursuer appealed against that 
dismissal. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
45 The Inner House upheld the dismissal of the case at first instance. It found that 
(1) the pursuer’s written pleadings did not sufficiently and clearly set out alle-
gations of misconduct supportive of a finding of medical negligence. The ma-
jority of the appeal bench might have been willing to overlook that failing on 
its own,36 Lord Brodie remarking that ‘where a pursuer is not professionally 
represented I consider that the court should be slow to dismiss his case on that 
ground alone where there is an alternative means of providing his opponent 
with the notice to which he is entitled’,37 and, had that been so, the case might 
 
36 Lady Clark was less sympathetic to the idea of resolving the procedural problems in the 
pursuer’s favour: see paras [55] to [56]. 
37 Para [39]. 
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have been remitted back to the court at first instance to cure this defect; how-
ever, in addition, (2) the types of loss which the pursuer claimed to have suf-
fered were not of themselves sufficient to found a damages claim, and this 
was fatal to the claim.  
c) Commentary 
46 This judgment illustrates very well two important aspects of pleading a claim 
for damages in delict: (1) a relevant ground of action must be pled; and (2) a 
relevant form of loss or damage must be averred. The appeal court were will-
ing to be procedurally flexible as regards the first of these, but the second 
proved to be an insurmountable substantive barrier to the claim. 
47 The pursuer’s claim undoubtedly suffered because he had brought the action 
as a party litigant, without the benefit of legal assistance. This caused quite a 
few problems during the course of the litigation. The judge at first instance 
had had to spend some time explaining aspects of procedure to the pursuer, 
and Lord Brodie noted on appeal that ‘the pursuer’s averments contained 
much extraneous and irrelevant material’.38 The appeal court recognised that 
these difficulties meant that he had not adequately pled the crucial issue in a 
claim of medical negligence, namely: whether the medical practitioner ‘has 
been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would 
be guilty of if acting with ordinary care’.39 That the majority of the appeal 
court felt that this problem of the adequacy of the pleadings could have been 
dealt with procedurally (a mechanism for doing so was suggested) demon-
strates a commendable effort by the judges to promote access to justice by as-
sisting party litigants wherever possible. However, where problems with a 
party litigant’s claim are not merely procedural but also substantive, a court 
cannot cure those problems. 
48 The substantive problem with the claim was explained by Lord Brodie as 
being that in: 
‘an action based on negligence, where there is no physical injury, damages are 
simply not awarded for shock, fear, anxiety or grief, unless they go the dis-
tance of amounting to an identified psychiatric illness. On this ground alone, 
in other words because the pursuer does not offer to prove any physical injury 
or any identifiable psychiatric or psychological disorder or condition, the 
Lord Ordinary held that the action could not succeed and should be dis-
missed. In my opinion he was right to do so.’40 
 
38 Para [4]. 
39 Lord President Clyde in Hunter v Hanley 1955 Session Cases (SC) 200 at 204. 
40 Para [43]. 
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This accurately summarises the requirements of the law of recoverable dam-
ages, and it identifies a fatal flaw in the pursuer’s claim. Had he been profes-
sionally advised, this would have been identified at the beginning of the pro-
cess and it is very unlikely that a claim would ever have been brought. 
49 The case serves as a reminder of the perils and pitfalls of a layperson raising 
his/her own legal claim, without the benefit of advice on the form or merits. It 
is also a reminder of the limits of actionable damages in personal injury 
claims: claims for distress and anxiety are actionable within the context of 
recognised psychiatric illness, but not otherwise unless consequent upon a 
physical injury.  
6. Cruden Building & Renewals Ltd v Scottish Water, Court of 
Session (Outer House), 5 July 2017, [2017] CSOH 98, [2017] 
BLR (Building Law Reports) 575: Liability of Water 
Operator to Contractor for Leakage of Polluted Water 
Resulting in Delay to Building Operations 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
50 The pursuers, a building company, claimed damages for an escape of polluted 
water from the defenders’ sewer onto a site on which the pursuers were carry-
ing out building works. The development of the site had been arranged under 
a contract entered into between the owner of the land, a housing association, 
and a developer (a related company of the pursuers). The related company had 
alienated its licence to enter on the site to the pursuers in order for the pursu-
ers to carry out the construction works.  
51 The pursuers’ claim was based on fault and negligence, breach of statutory 
duty, and nuisance. As a result of the escape of the polluted water, the pursu-
ers had been delayed in carrying out the contract work, which had resulted in 
their suffering economic loss.  
52 The defenders disputed that the pursuers had title and interest to sue, given 
that the pursuers were not the owners of the land which had been affected by 
the polluted water. The pursuers answered that they had a ‘possessory inter-
est’ in the site, and that their comfortable enjoyment of the site had been com-
promised by the inundation of the water. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
53 Judgment in the Outer House was given by Lord Bannatyne. His Lordship 
thought that the pursuers’ claim for economic loss was inextricably linked to 
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the damage done to the building site, and that the governing principle relating 
to claims for damage to property was that set out by Lord Brandon in Leigh 
and Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd41 (later approved by the Scottish 
courts in Nacap Ltd v Moffat Plant Ltd42): 
‘in order to enable a person to claim in negligence for loss caused to him by 
reason of loss or damage to property, he must have had either the legal owner-
ship of or a possessory title to the property concerned at the time when the 
loss or damage occurred, and it is not enough for him to have only had con-
tractual rights in relation to such property which have been adversely affected 
by the loss of or damage to it.’43 
One of the prior authorities,44 which Lord Brandon had drawn upon in formu-
lating that principle, was a case involving water damage to property not 
owned by the plaintiff who unsuccessfully sought to recover its economic 
losses.  
54 Lord Bannatyne further thought that cases indicating that tenants have a right 
to sue for economic losses deriving from their tenancy of land (which gives 
them an interest comparable to that of the owner) did not assist the pursuers, 
as the pursuers were not lessees. Similarly, authority indicating that posses-
sors without a lease whose interest was nonetheless comparable in extent to 
that of a tenant was equally unhelpful for the pursuers, given their own very 
limited right in relation to the land. 
55 In consequence, the court dismissed the action against the defenders.  
c) Commentary 
56 This decision seems correct in principle and consistent with prior authority. 
The courts are reluctant to allow recovery for pure economic loss (such as that 
suffered by the pursuers) and require that there be a sufficiently close relation-
ship (one of so-called ‘proximity’) between pursuer and defender before such 
a claim can be made. In relation to a landowner and a contractor working on 
neighbouring land, there would not normally be anything in such a relation-
ship to indicate the presence of the necessary degree of closeness of relation-
ship between the parties. In terms of possible proximity in this case, the judg-
ment narrates nothing about any communications between the pursuers and 
defenders, or indeed whether the defenders even knew the identity of the pur-
suers at the time when the damage occurred. Proximity exists between neigh-
bouring landowners by virtue of their respective rights of adjacent ownership, 
 
41 [1986] AC 785. 
42 1987 SLT 221. 
43 Leigh and Sillivan at 809. 
44 Cattle v Stockton Waterworks Co (1875) Law Reports (LR) 10 QB 453.  
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but of course the pursuers were not the owners of the land. The farthest that 
the Scottish courts had previously gone in granting a non-owner a right to 
claim for economic loss caused to property owned by another was in a case in 
which they allowed such a claim by a party whose unfettered possessory right 
to use a helicopter owned by another was sufficiently extensive as to be com-
parable to that of a lessee.45 
57 In Scotland, as in England, this limitation upon the rights of non-owners to 
claim economic losses deriving from damage to another’s property is clearly 
grounded in policy, a policy favoured by the court in the Nacap case because 
‘[t]he rule is simple to understand and easy to apply; it is important that there 
should be certainty in law.’ More fundamentally, of course, the policy is 
grounded in a desire to contain damages claims within acceptable and man-
ageable bounds: if the requirement of ownership (or lease) of the damaged 
property were abandoned, then there might be countless parties who could 
conceivably claim for economic losses flowing from damaged property.  
58 One somewhat unhelpful aspect of the judgment is that, although the pursuers 
advanced their claim on multiple grounds – negligence, breach of statutory 
duty, and nuisance – the judgment of the court does not consider these various 
grounds separately. In dismissing the pursuers’ claim, the judge focuses on an 
ownership requirement in title to sue in respect of damaged property which 
derives from prior negligence cases. Whether that rule is equally applicable to 
claims founded in the nominate delict of nuisance and in breach of statutory 
duty is not explored or explained by the court in the judgment.  
7. Kaizer v Scottish Ministers, Court of Session (Outer House), 
22 August 2017, [2017] CSOH 110: Liability of Prison 
Authorities for Assault by Inmate on Fellow Inmate 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
59 The pursuer was an inmate at Aberdeen Prison. He was severely assaulted in 
the prison gym by a second inmate, who was subsequently convicted for at-
tempted murder in relation to the assault. The second inmate had previously 
threatened to assault the pursuer. A prison guard, though made aware of this 
by the pursuer, had failed to take any further action. The pursuer sued the de-
fenders as being liable for the failings of the prison service. He alleged that 
they had breached a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of those within 
their prisons, including prisoners. The defenders accepted that such a duty 
rested on them but denied that they were in breach of it.  
 
45 North Scottish Helicopters Ltd v United Technologies Corp Inc (No 1) 1987 SLT 77.  
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b) Judgment of the Court 
60 The judge (Lord Ericht) held that, on the facts of the case, the five require-
ments laid down by Lord Diplock in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd46 for 
establishing the tortious liability of prison authorities (A) for the conduct of a 
prisoner in their care (C) for harm to another (B) had been met, namely: (1) 
that A had the legal right to detain C in penal custody and to control his acts 
while in custody; (2) that A was actually exercising that right at the time of 
C’s tortious act; (3) that A, if it had taken reasonable care in the exercise of its 
right of custody could have prevented C from doing the tortious act which 
caused damage to the person or property of B; (4) that the relationship be-
tween A and B had the characteristics that, at the time of C’s tortious act, A 
had the legal right to control the situation of B or his property as respects 
physical proximity to C; and (5) that A could reasonably have foreseen that B 
was likely to sustain damage to his person or property if A did not take rea-
sonable care to prevent C from doing tortious acts of the kind which he did. 
The judge therefore held the defenders liable in damages in an amount to be 
determined at a later hearing.  
c) Commentary 
61 The liability of prison authorities for attacks by one prisoner on another is 
highly dependent on the specific facts of the case. Prisons can be violent plac-
es, but not all prisoners demonstrate violent tendencies. Where there has been 
no past history of violence on the part C, or of ill will on C’s part towards B 
coupled with opportunity being afforded to C to attack B, then it is likely not 
to be reasonably foreseeable that C will attack B (a point noted in the earlier 
case of Leslie v Secretary of State for Scotland47). Where a prison guard fails 
to pass on threats made towards specific prisoners, this has previously been 
thought to tend towards liability if those threats are acted upon.48 Such threats 
constitute specific, crystallised risks to the well-being of an inmate, making 
harm to such an inmate reasonably foreseeable. There is thus a duty resting 
upon prison staff to act upon them. More generalised threats of prisoners 
wanting to harm others generally, but not a specific person, may well however 
not trigger liability,49 given that the management of such inchoate threats is an 
unavoidable part of prison life.  
62 So much for the decision on the facts. What, however, if what were to be 
discovered was a threat by a prisoner to harm someone outside of the supervi-
sory scope of the prison, for instance a member of the public? If such a threat 
were subsequently acted upon by the prisoner (either personally, when later at 
 
46 [1970] AC 1004. 
47 1999 Reparation Law Reports (Rep LR) 39. 
48 Whannel v Secretary of State for Scotland 1989 SLT 671. 
49 See Stenning v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2002] England & Wales Court of 
Appeal, Civil Division (EWCA Civ) 793. 
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liberty, or through arrangements made by the prisoner to have the harm com-
mittee by someone presently at liberty), ought the prison authorities to be lia-
ble for their failure to act upon it? The test from Dorset Yacht narrated above 
would be inapplicable given the parties involved, but would liability nonethe-
less arise? While one might expect that, from a moral standpoint, the prison 
authorities ought to report the matter to the police, it would be a stretch at 
common law to establish a duty of care for harm committed outside the area 
of control of those authorities, albeit that the instigating party was within that 
area of control. Reasonable foreseeability of harm might be present on such 
facts, but the worrying prospect of making prison authorities liable for harm 
committed by persons not within their control would be likely to lead to the 
harm being held too remote from the authorities to give rise to a duty of care 
on their part.  
63 The decision is an important reminder for the prison authorities that all staff 
must ensure that threats made by prisoners against fellow inmates or members 
of staff must be reported and acted upon; if they are not, and the prisoner or 
staff member threatened is harmed, the prison authorities are likely to be 
found to have breached their duty of care.  
8. Personal Injury 
64 A couple of noteworthy cases of personal injury resulting from alleged local 
authority negligence were handed down in 2017. In the first, Pocock v High-
land Council,50 the pursuer sought to hold the Council liable when he slipped 
and fell as a result of a paving slab which was misaligned. Such cases of poor-
ly maintained pavements and roads are on the rise, as Councils seek to trim 
their budgets by delaying repairs to infrastructure. In this case, however, the 
Council avoided liability because the pursuer failed to prove by exactly how 
much the paving slab had been misaligned; a very minor misalignment, which 
this might have been, would be unlikely to have justified a claim that failure 
promptly to realign it demonstrated negligence on the Council’s part. 
65 In the second case, Bowes v Highland Council,51 the driver of a pickup truck 
had been killed when his vehicle had swerved as it approached a bridge, 
crashing into a weakened parapet and falling into a river. The court, reviewing 
previous Scottish authorities on the issue, felt obliged to follow the law ap-
plied in those authorities, viz that a Council owes road users a common law 
duty of care for failures to remedy hazards caused by the state of the roads 
(and, by extension, road bridges). The fact that English law recognises a duty 
of that scope was thought by the court to be irrelevant. The Council was held 
 
50 [2017] CSOH 40, 2017 Rep LR 69. 
51 [2017] CSOH 53, 2017 SLT 749. 
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liable for the driver’s death on account of its failure properly to maintain the 
parapet. The fact that the evidence showed that the deceased had not been 
driving carefully at the time of the accident was held to be irrelevant, because, 
had the parapet been properly maintained, the vehicle would have been con-
tained and the pursuer would not have died.  
66 A further noteworthy case is one of the last to be brought under the unre-
formed law relating to the prescription of claims for childhood abuse, prior to 
the coming into force of the Limitation (Childhood Abuse)(Scotland) Act 
2017 (considered at nos 1–5 above). K v The Marist Brothers52 was an unsuc-
cessful appeal against a first instance decision not to waive the triennium in 
respect of a claim for damages for childhood physical and sexual abuse. The 
alleged abuse occurred between around 1962 and 1965, more than 50 years 
before the action was raised. The appellant tried to argue that he had been dis-
abled from pleading by ‘unsoundness of mind’53 as a result of the abuse, but 
he had not led any expert evidence on this. Additionally, the appeal court stat-
ed that the defenders would be materially prejudiced were the claim to be al-
lowed at this stage, given the length of time which had passed since the al-
leged abuse. The decision seems a reasonable one, on both points. Moreover, 
given new sec 17D to the 1973 Act, which in the case of historic childhood 
abuse, continues to apply the triennium in cases where the defender satisfies 
the court that he/she would be substantially prejudiced were the action to pro-
ceed, one can speculate that the changes to the law brought in by the 2017 Act 
might well not have availed the pursuer in this case. 
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52 [2017] CSIH 2, 2017 SC 258. 
53 A ground for postponing the running of the triennium: see sec 17(3) of the Prescription 
and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. 
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